Quantum measurement theory has fallen under the resticting influence of the attempt to explain the fundamental axioms of quantum theory in terms of the theory itself. This has not only led to confusion but has also restricted our attention to a limited class of measurements. This paper outlines some of the novel types of measurements which fall outside the usual textbook description.
The problem of quantum measurement has been with us since the foundations of the the theory were laid in the mid 1920's. It has generated much discussion, with little resolution of the questions raised. I will argue in this talk that this situation has arisen in part because of the confusion brought about by giving two very different concepts the same name, with the expected result that the valid questions related to the two concepts become entangled.
It furthermore has led to a restriction on the types of measurements considered within the theory. In this talk I am not going to propose any radical or even very new interpretations of the theory of quantum mechanics. I am rather going to engage in an ancient philosophical past-time, name to propose that we use distinct terms for distinct concepts. I am then going to review some of the novel insights which have been obtained recently ( especially by the group around Aharonov) regarding some novel types of measurement.
I. MEASUREMENT, DETERMINATION AND KNOWLEDGE
The concept of measurement in quantum mechanics has had a long and confused history.
There are essentially two separate concepts which have been conflated under the same title, concepts with a very different status in the theory a priori. In part the intense confusion surrounding the word results from the attempt to reconcile these two different concepts, or rather to apply the properties of the one concept to the other.
The first concept subsumed under the term measurement is an axiomatic concept. Quantum mechanics, as with all of our theories in physics, is based on a set of mathematical structures. In the case of quantum mechanics, these structures are those of complex Hilbert spaces, and operators on those Hilbert spaces. In addition to such mathematical structures, the theory must also make contact with the physical world. Structures in the theory must be correlated by structures in our experience of the world itself. As with all theories, quantum mechanics is a means of answering questions about our experiences of the world.
Furthermore they are questions which are related to the particulars and peculiarities of the actual world we live in. The theory requires a mapping the mathematical structure onto our experiences. As in all physical theories this takes the form both of a general map, of general structures of the world which we expect to have a broad range of validity, and structures which reflect the particulars and peculiarities of our experiences.
In classical physics, the former is called the dynamical theory, while the latter is called the initial conditions. The theory encompasses the identification of dynamic variables and equations of motion, while the "initial conditions" encompass those aspects of our experience which are felt to be peculiar to the individual time and place of those experiences.
Quantum mechanics contains both of these aspects as well, but in a very different form from that of classical physics. The dynamics is represented by the operators, while, in the simplest case, the particulars of the situation is represented by the vector in the Hilbert space, the wave function. I will denote these particulars by the term knowledge or conditions, rather than the term "initial conditions", since as we will see, conditions need not be initial, nor are they in general equivalent to initial conditions (as they are in classical physics).
In addition to explanations, the theory must produce answers, must give us the answers to questions that we may have about the physical situations that we are interested in. It is here that the theory actually makes contact with the physical world. In quantum mechanics these answers are in terms of probabilities. The usual phrasology goes something like " When one measures a quantity, and the system is in the state |φ >, the outcome of that measurement is one of the eigenvalues, say a, of the operator, say A, representing the physical variable measured, and the probability is given by the usual expression | < a|φ > |."
However, the word "measure" brings with it the image of a physical process. Measurements are performed by means of measuring apparatuses. As aspects of the physical world, such measuring apparatuses should themselves be describable by quantum mechanics itself.
But it is difficult to have a system in which at the same time a concept is an axiomatic feature of the theory, and one describable by the theory. I would therefore suggest that the word "determine" be used instead for this axiomatic feature of the theory. Thus I would rephrase the above sentence as " When one determines a quantity, and the knowledge ( or conditions) under which one wishes to determine that quantity are represented by the vector |φ >, then the determination of a quantity represented by A gives one of eigenvalues of A, say a with probability | < a|φ > | 2 ."
Determination, in this axiomatic sense, says nothing about how the determination was made. It is simply a statement of a mapping from the theory to our experience, in which some knowledge sets the conditions on the questions we wish to ask, and some knowledge represents the answers to the questions we want to ask.
What then is a measurement? I will reserve the term measurement for a physical process, a process which is describable in terms of quantum theory itself. A measurement is a process in which one has two separate physical systems, represented by two separate sets of dynamical operators. Furthermore the dynamical evolution is such that, given certain conditions on the measuring apparatus, a determination of some quantity associated with the measuring apparatus will give information about the system of interest.
Von Neumann [1] showed that under certain conditions, a measurement on a system could be treated as a determination of that system. I.e., certain types of measurement ( in which one makes a determination of some aspect of the measuring apparatus only) acted in all ways as though one had instead made a determination of the system itself. There is a consistency in quantum mechanics, such that the axiomatic concept I call determination, is closely related to the physical process I call measurement. However, notice that in von
Neumann's analysis, one has not done away with the concept of determination. One still must apply the axiomatic concept of determination to the measuring apparatus before one can draw any conclusions at all from the theory. It is just that such measurements allow us to reduce a complicated system ( apparatus plus system of interest) to a simple system ( the system of interest alone) under certain conditions. This mapping of a complex system onto a simpler system does not however in any way change the requirement for the axiomatic concept of "determination". It simply changes the system to which we need to apply the concept.
At least in part the measurement problem in quantum mechanics is the disquiet that physicists feel for the concept of "determination". It feels like an extra and extraneous concept, a non-physical concept. In classical physics, one can imagine that the theory and reality are in complete correspondence. The position of a particle really is a number, and our experience of that position is simply the experience of that number. The physical map from experience to theory is just an identification of those numbers in the theory with the experience. (That some fairly sophisticated manipulations of experience are necessary to extract that number is a technical detail.) In quantum mechanics on the other hand, there seems to be no direct map from our experience to the theory. The operators themselves have far too much structure for experience. The state, or Hilbert space vector itself, has the wrong properties to map onto our experience. The only map is the rather indirect and seemingly unnatural one of "determination". One would like either to subsume determi-nation under some physical concept of the theory ( but that would loose the only relation between experience and the theory that the theory contains) or to introduce some other relation between the theory and experience from which one could derive 'determination' in a natural way. That neither of these objectives has ever been achieved is a large part of the 'problem of measurement' in quantum mechanics.
However, I do not want to spend any more of my time on this issue. Rather I want to point out the the concern about this problem has warped our thinking about quantum mechanics and about the types of measurement possible in the theory. Because the vonNeumann type of measurement creates the possibility of reduction of a complex system to a simpler system, the idea has become implanted that all measurement must be of the same sort. Because determination has a certain form, measurement must have the same form seems to be the thinking. However it is becoming clear, especially through the work of the group around Aharonov, that this is too restrictive.
Measurement is a physical process by which one has two system interacting, and by making a determination on the one system, one can obtain information about the other system. In certain cases, the information obtained is the same as a determination, but in other cases it can differ significantly. Furthermore, because of the similarity of wave mechanics to classical wave theory, the impression has also arisen that conditions in quantum mechanics are entirely equivalent to conditions in classical mechanics, namely initial conditions. Let me look at the last case first.
It has long been known to some ( but ignored or resisted by most) that the conditions in quantum mechanics differ significantly from those of classical physics [2] . In classical physics, all conditions can, by use of the equation of motion, be mapped onto initial conditions.
Whether one measures the position now and the momentum two days hence, or measures them both now is really irrelevant. For any condition, imposed at time, one can always, by use of the equations of motion, produce initial conditions which are entirely equivalent in all of their predictions to those general conditions. However, as Aharonov, Bergmann, and
Liebowitz [2] already showed about 30 years ago ( and as has been independently rediscovered often since-e.g., [5] ) setting conditions at different times may not be equivalent to any initial conditions. The simplest example is that of a spin 1/2 particle whose x component of spin is known at 9AM and y component at 11 AM. Say both are known to have value +1/2. The probability that if one determines the component cos(θ)S x + sin(θ)S y at 10AM, the answer will be +1/2 is
Note there exist no initial condition-wave function or density matrix-which would give this answer. It is unity for both θ = 0 and for θ = π/2. apparatus and the interaction are designed so that if the initial state is an eigen state of the measured quantity, the outcome will be approximately given by that value for the measured quantity, in this pre and post conditioned experiment, the expected value for the measurement is impossible according to all the usual tenants of quantum mechanics.
Let me make this clear by an example. Our measuring apparatus is a trivial infinite mass free particle. it is coupled to a spin s particle ( in my example s = 20). The coupling is of the form
Ie, the interaction is such that if the initial state of the free particle is ψ(x), and the state of the spin is in an eigenstate of the operator S // say with eigenvalue σ, then the final state of the free particle is ψ(x − ǫσ). Thus by measuring the displacement of the the free particle due to the interaction one can estimate σ and thus measure S // . If the particle begins in an eigenstate ( or almost and eigenstate) of X (ie ψ is sharply peaked about some value x 0 with an uncertainty much less than ǫ) then the displacement during the interaction can be measured precisely by determining the value x of X after the interaction, and σ = (x−x 0 )/ǫ will be a measurement of S. On the other hand, if the initial ψ has a spread of ∆x, then the final determination of X will give the displacement only to ±∆x. Ie, we will have σ = (x − x 0 )/ǫ ± ∆x/ǫ. This is the sense in which the measuring apparatus is inexact. The determination of some variable of the measuring apparatus only gives an inexact estimate of the value of some dynamic variable of the system. Now consider the following situation. Set conditions such that before the interaction with the measuring apparatus, the value of S x is known to be its maximum possible value, s. Furthermore after the interaction, the value of the y component, S y , is known to be the maximum possible value, s. What is the distribution of possible outcomes for the measuring apparatus? One would expect this to be something like the some probability distribution over the various possible values for S // convoluted with the initial probability distribution for the position of the free particle. Ie, one would expect something like σ P σ |ψ(x − ǫσ)| 2 where P σ is a probability for the spin to have value −s ≤ σ ≤ s. In particular, the average value ( expectation value) for X should lie somewhere between x 0 − ǫs and x 0 + ǫs. If the measurement is sufficiently accurate this expectation is fulfilled. Figure 1 plots the probability distribution for the location of the particle ( x 0 = 0 and ǫ = 1) in the case where the initial spread of the wave function for the particle is small. However, Figure 2 is the plot of the distribution for the value of the position of the particle in the case where the initial spread for X is large (of order ±ǫ (s)). Note that the center of the probability distribution is at x ≈ 28, and the probability that x would lie between -20 and 20, the naively expected values, is very small. Using the determined value of X to infer the value of S // gives a value at all times larger than the maximum eigenvalue of S // . 
Figure 2
The probablility distribution for the pointer with the same conditions as in figure 1 but with a large error (5) for the infered value of the spin. Note that the distribution centers around the value of 28 and has only a very small probability of lying between 20 and -20.
Note that if we regard S as a classical vector spin, and we know that S x and S y both have value s, then S // will have value S 2 x + S 2 y = √ 2s ≈ 28. Note also that this works in this way only if the initial state ψ(x) is sufficiently smooth. (In my case I have chosen it to be a gaussian). In particular, sharp features in ψ will destroy this property.
One reaction to this example is that it is not a real measurement. However, it meets all of the criteria of a measuring apparatus, in that if the state of the spin is an eigenstate, the measuring apparatus produces the value to the accuracy to which the apparatus is designed.
What we have here is a strange result which arises from the combination of an inexact measuring apparatus, combined with the inequivalence of conditions in quantum mechanics to be equivalent to initial conditions. (For any initial conditions, the expectations that the result would simply have been the sum of the probabilities of the result for the eigenstates would have been true.) Note that this is a measurement situation in which the measurement is not equivalent to any determination on the spin system itself.
There is another measurement situation which leads to results in conflict with the von Neumann equivalence of measurements and determination. This is a situation I call adiabatic measurement. It arises out another situation noted by the group around Aharonov [3] . (They call it 'protected' measurements, a term I feel to be highly misleading. They furthermore use it to argue that the wave function is 'real' in some sense, a conclusion I also have great difficulty with [4] .) This is a situation in which the measuring apparatus is coupled to the system sufficiently weakly, and the system's evolution during the interaction with the measuring apparatus is dominated by a Hamiltonian with sufficiently widely spaced energy levels that the interaction with the apparatus can be treated throughout as an adiabatic perturbation.
Consider a system whose Hamiltonian during the course of the interaction is given by H 0 . Consider couplings to a set of measuring apparatuses ( which for simplicity we will take as free infinitely massive particles again, although nothing changes if we use more complex measuring apparatuses).
where the A i are a variety of operators associated with the system (in general noncommuting) and the p i are the momenta of a set of free infinitely massive particles. We can solve this assuming that the measuring apparatus are in the momentum eigenstates |p i >, to obtain the adiabatic approximation to the Schroedinger equation for the system
where
where |E 0 > are the eigenstates of H 0 and E 0 their eigenvalue. Thus the equation of motion for the state of the system plus measuring apparatus can be written as
After the interaction with the apparatus is finished, the state is
Each of the measuring apparatuses has been displaced by an amount
ie by an amount proportional to the expectation value of the measured operator A i in the state |E 0 >. Now, if we assume that the states φ(x i ) are sufficiently narrow that there is at least one
> is larger than the initial uncertainty in φ i (x), then the various energy eigenvalues will decohere. The measuring apparatuses will point to a value < E 0 |A i |E 0 >, ie an expectation value, for some value of E 0 , with the probability of that E 0 given by
There are a number of strange features of this result. In the first place, the value to which the measuring apparatus points is not that corresponding to one of the eigenvalues of A i . The measuring apparatus measures A i , but the pointer does not give one of A i 's eigenvalues but rather gives an expectation value, < E 0 |A i |E 0 > in any single measurement.
Furthermore if we repeat the experiment, we will, as expected get a variety of answers that the pointer points to , namely each of the various expectation values for the various possible values of E 0 . Over a large number of trials, we expect to get a number of trials in which we get a specific value < E 0 |A i |E 0 > a number of times given by N| < E 0 |ψ > | 2 times. Thus the statistical expectation value for the measurements of A i are
But the quantum mechanical expectation value of A i is given by
In general, only if the vectors E 0 are also eigenvectors of A i are these two expressions the same. I.e., the statistical expectation value of A i obtained by performing a large number of such adiabatic measurements is not the quantum expectation of A i in the state of the system.
We thus have a situation which violates almost all of the standard lore about measurements. Since the A i are not necessarily commuting ( there is nothing in the above derivation which demands that they commute), we can, in a single measurement measure non-commuting variables. Furthermore, if the initial state is an eigenstate of H 0 , then every measurement in and ensemble of measurements will give exactly the same value for the measurement of those non-commuting variables. there will be no statistical uncertainty in the result. Furthermore, the outcome of the measurement is not an eigenvalue of the operator corresponding to the measured quantity A i . It is rather an expectation value of that quantity. The statistical distribution of the results does not depend on the quantities A i being measured. Rather, the statistical distribution depends on the eigenvectors of the Hamiltonian H 0 which is not coupled to any measuring apparatus at all.
It is interesting to note that the standard von Neumann measurement falls into exactly this class as well. In the von Neumann measurement, the interaction with the measuring apparatus is such that the coupling to the apparatus dominates the dynamics during the measurement. eg, the hamiltonian is of the form
In this case, the dominant hamiltonian during the interaction is A, since δ(0) is infinite. The coupling to the measuring apparatus A clearly commutes with the dominant Hamiltonian A and thus the interaction is adiabatic for an arbitrary time dependence of ǫ(t) = ǫδ(t).
According to our adiabatic analysis, the measurement will give us various expectation values < E 0 |A|E 0 > where the E 0 are the eigenvalues of the dominant hamiltonian A. I.e., the E 0 are just the eigenvalues a of A. Thus the measured quantities will be < a|A|a >= a the eigenvalues of A. The probability of obtaining the value of a in the measurement is
, and the statistical expectation value of A is
We thus see that the usual rules on measurement are simply a special case of the results obtained for adiabatic measurements.
Note however that the general adiabatic measurement is not equivalent to a determination. This however does not make them any the less interesting as measurements. In fact the archetypal quantum measurement example, the Stern Gerlach experiment, used in almost all the text books as an example of the von Neumann measurement is actually an adiabatic measurement, in which non-commuting observables, the spin in both of the transverse directions is adiabatically measured. For details see reference [4] .
II. CONCLUSIONS
The key points of this talk have been 1) in the standard formulation of quantum mechanics the term measurement is used to denote two distinct concepts. In order to clarify the problems, I have suggested that it would be useful to use separate terms to denote separate concepts, and have proposed that we use 'determination' for the axiomatic concept and reserve measurement for the physical notion of using changes induced into one system to deduce properties of another system. 
